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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20000991-CA
v.
DANIEL B. POWELL,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. This
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp.
2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
L

Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant for illegal possession of
a firearm where the gun was found in a backpack on the front
passenger seat of a car over which he had had sole possession for
approximately eight hours, and where his cigarette rolling papers were
found in the same backpack?
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [this Court] must

sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, If 5, 975 P.2d 501 (quoting
State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1998)).
II.

Should defendant's sentences be affirmed where defense counsel spoke
at sentencing and defendant received the very sentences requested?
Because this claim was not preserved below, defendant asks this Court to review it

for plain error. Br. Aplt. at 5. To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that
(1) an error occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(3) defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND RULE PROVISIONS
The following statutory and rule provisions relevant to this appeal are attached at
Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 8, 1999, defendant was charged by amended information with illegal
possession of a handgun, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of controlled
substance, and an improper lane change (R. 26-27).
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial
(R. 20-21; R. 92:2-3). After the State's case-m-chief, defendant moved to dismiss the
illegal possession of a handgun charge and the improper lane change charge (R. 93:34).

i

The trial court granted defendant's motion as to the improper lane change charge, but
denied his motion as to the illegal possession of a handgun charge (R. 93:34, 37). After
defendant's case-in-chief and the State's rebuttal, the trial court found defendant guilty of
the remaining three charges (R. 29-30; R. 93:77).
Defendant, unable to attend sentencing because he was in a federal penitentiary in
Pennsylvania, consented to be sentenced in absentia (R. 56-60, 66-67; R. 94 Tab 7:1).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 0-5 years in prison for illegal possession of a
handgun, and 6 months in jail for each of the remaining convictions (R. 61-62, 63-64; R.
94 Tab 7:1-3). The sentences were to run concurrently to each other and, as requested by
defense counsel, concurrent with the federal sentence defendant was then serving (R. 5960, 61-62, 63-64; R. 94 Tab 7:2-3).l Defendant timely appealed (R. 61-62, 66-68).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 17, 1998, defendant was involved in a car accident while driving on
1-15 through Bountiful, Utah (R. 94:3). Defendant was alone in his car when the accident
occurred and had been in sole possession of the car from mid-morning until 7:00 pm that
evening, the time of the accident (R. 93:60-62). The accident involved four vehicles (R.
93:4). However, only defendant's car was disabled (R. 93:4, 25). Thus, while the other

!

At the same hearing, defendant was sentenced to one year in jail for witness
tampering, to run consecutively to the other sentences (R. 63-64; R. 94 Tab 7:1-3). The
witness tampering charge related to a threat defendant made to Sergeant Anderson, an
officer who testified at defendant's trial on the current charges (R. 2; R. 93:3-20; R. 94
Tab 5:6-7). Defendant pleaded guilty to this offense (R. 94 Tab 5:6-7).
3

cars were driven into the emergency lane after the accident, defendant's car remained in
the center lane of the highway (R. 93:4).
When Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John Ely arrived, defendant was told to leave
his vehicle and move to the side of the road, into the emergency lane (R. 93:5, 25). At
that time, Trooper Ely "noticed a strong odor of burnt marijuana" (R. 93:26). When
Sergeant Anderson arrived shortly thereafter, Ely told him of the odor (R. 93:26).
For a time, however, the officers focused on clearing defendant's disabled car out
of traffic's way (R. 93:5). Thus, Anderson instructed Ely to push the vehicle while
Anderson steered it (R. 93:5). As Anderson opened the car door, he "smell[ed] the odor
of burnt marijuana inside the car" (R. 93:6). Then, as Anderson went to get into the car,
defendant "walked expeditiously towards me" (R. 93:5). "[I]t appeared to me he did not
want me in the car" (R. 93:5). As they talked, Anderson "detected a strong odor of burnt
marijuana" consistent with Trooper Ely's observation (R. 93:6). Anderson did however
allow defendant to get into the car and steer it into the emergency lane (R. 93:5-6).
Sergeant Anderson then confronted defendant with his suspicions regarding the
marijuana odor (R. 93:6). Although defendant claimed he had not smoked any marijuana
recently, Anderson told defendant that he was going to search defendant's car (R. 93:6-7).
Defendant did not want the car searched; he told Anderson something "to the effect of
don't search my vehicle" (R. 93:7, 20).

4

During the search, Sergeant Anderson found a long piece of wire consistent with
that "used to clean out a marijuana pipe" on the driver's side floor board (R. 93:8).
Around the console area, he found a cigarette lighter and some lip salve (R. 93:8).
Anderson later found a marijuana pipe with marijuana in it approximately 5 to 8 feet from
where defendant had been standing after the accident (R. 93:11). The pipe appeared to
have recently been placed at that location because it did not have any scratches, marks, or
dirt on it to indicate that it had been on the ground for a long period of time (Id.).
In his search of defendant's car, Sergeant Anderson proceeded to the backpack
sitting upright on the front passenger-side seat. In it, Anderson found cigarette rolling
papers often used for rolling marijuana cigarettes, and a fanny pack that contained a 9millimeter handgun and several magazines of ammunition (R. 93:10, 12-13, 56). When
Anderson approached defendant about the weapon, he and defendant "got into a little bit
of an argument about the status of the gun, whether or not it was loaded" (R. 93:15).
Defendant was "adamant" that the gun was not loaded and accused Anderson of putting
the bullet in the chamber (R. 93:15, 28). Defendant, however, never indicated any
surprise that the gun was found in the car (R. 93:68). He merely said that the gun was his
wife's and that she had placed it in the car (R. 93:15).
At trial, defendant claimed that he volunteered to move his car for police only
because it was his car, he was the one who was in the wreck, and he was sure the officers
"got enough other stuff to do" (R. 93:54). He also claimed that he "didn't have any

problem with [Sergeant Anderson] searching the car" (R. 93.55). Defendant then claimed
the wire found m the car was used to dig his stereo knob out of the console when it fell
off (R. 93 59). He claimed the lighter was used to burn incense (R. 93:59) He claimed
he had never seen the marijuana pipe before and that he wouldn't use such a pipe because
"[t]he unnatural metal gives . . . off vapors" and is "not healthy for you" (R. 93 59).
Concerning the backpack found on the front passenger seat, both defendant and his
wife testified that the backpack and the gun found inside were hers (R. 93:39, 41-42, 56,
65-66). Defendant admitted that he knew his wife usually earned the gun in that
backpack (R. 93:65-66). He just didn't know she had left the backpack in the car that day
(R. 93:57, 66). He explained that his wife must have left it in the car earlier that morning
when she hurriedly left the car after an argument (R. 93:57, 66). He claimed he did not
notice the backpack after she left because "everything was in the back of the car" until the
accident, when, because of the force of the collision, it "all ended up in the front seat and
the front seat floor area" (R. 93:66). Thus, until then, "I didn't know [the gun] was there"
(R. 93:57). Defendant acknowledged, however, that the cigarette papers found m the
same backpack were his (R. 93:59, 63).
Sergeant Anderson testified on rebuttal that it was highly improbable that a
backpack placed on the back seat or floor of a car would land directly on the passenger
seat in a convenient upright position after a collision of this type (R. 93 68).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHERE THE GUN
WAS FOUND IN A BACKPACK ON THE FRONT PASSENGER
SEAT OF A CAR OVER WHICH HE HAD HAD SOLE
POSSESSION FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS, AND
WHERE HIS CIGARETTE ROLLING PAPERS WERE FOUND IN
THE SAME BACKPACK2
Defendant claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his

conviction for illegal possession of a firearm because it "shows that [he] did not
c

exercise[] dominion or control' over the firearm 'with knowledge of its presence.'"

Aplt. Br. at 17 (citations omitted). Specifically, defendant argues that "[t]here was no
evidence presented that [he] knew the firearm was in the car, let alone in the back pack
owned by Ms. Stewart. Moreover, the State presented no evidence that Mr. Powell
exercised any control over the firearm." Id. Defendant's claim is without merit.
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [this Court] must
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, f 5, 975 P.2d 501 (citation
omitted).

:

On appeal, defendant challenges only his illegal possession of a firearm
conviction. See Aplt. Br. at 13-18. He does not challenge his convictions for possession
of drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance.
8

Section "V)-10-503 provides that a person "may not
! le "is an unlaw fill user of a controlled substance.

unlawful user of a controlled substance,

possess

an> handgun ' it"

. I..M i^de -\nn. S 76-10-50^(3)

id. lie claims only that the evidence was

insufficient to prove he possessed the gun found next to him in his car on December 1.7,
l

l

W *

>.pll

H i ml I

•

••'

'

..

.

•

.

.

'

•

- •

"[Ajctual physical possession is i lot i lecessan • t : : m\ ri ;:t a defendant of possession
t^lltn illegal weapon]." MLIU -. r'ox, ~09 P.2d 31 o, 3 Is (Ltah 1985). Rather, a
Mutuant may be convicteu pa^cd on constructs e possession so long as "there %,. a
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accused had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control o\ •* •*• ;
Id. at 319; State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991). "[I]f the evidence
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''Whether a sufficient ne\— . . . exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case/' r ^ ,

- > 2d at 319; £7/<7v, f^O P ?d -.t 1 "88. Relevant factors include
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"incriminating statements made by the accused"; "incriminating behavior of the accused";
and the "presence of [the gun] in a specific area over which the accused had control, such
as a closet or drawer containing the accused's clothes or other personal effects." Fox.
709 P.2d at 319 (citation omitted). This list of factors is not exhaustive. See State v.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911. Nonetheless, consideration of those factors
here makes clear that defendant's conviction is not "against the clear weight of the
evidence." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, at f 5 (citation omitted).
Ownership or occupancy. The gun was found in a backpack sitting on the front
passenger seat of the car defendant was driving (R. 93:10, 12-13. 56). The car was
registered to defendant (R. 93:39, 48). When the gun was found, defendant had been in
sole possession of the car for approximately eight hours (R. 93:60-62). Cf State v.
Rivera. 906 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah App. 1995) (holding that where defendant had
exclusive control over truck in which gun found on passenger side floor board, fact that
gun may have been girlfriend's "would not negate a finding of defendant's constructive
possession when it was shown that he had dominion and control over the gun"), rev 'd in
part on other grounds, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997).
Incriminating statements. The gun was discovered during a search of
defendant's car (R. 93:10, 12-13, 56). Prior to the search, defendant said something "to
the effect of don't search my vehicle" (R. 93:7. 20). Then, when confronted with the gun
at the scene, defendant reacted without surprise that it was found (R. 93:68). He rnereK
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stated that his wife had put the gun in the car and then focused on whether the gun was
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accident were seriously in; . M the officers* primary concern upon arriving at the jw^e
was to rem.ove iKicndoiu .^ u^aouu ^ v . c n-m lanes of traffic (R. 93:4-5, 25). To tl lat
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93:5). However, as Anderson went to get into the car, defendant ."walked expeditiously
towards [Trn1 " ~/\ 'ng Anderson the impression that defendant "did \
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un' --ic *-i 'I ,>

»,:i'. jxpianvi on:
I seen Officer Anderson approaching -i> ..ir .K^ U looked like ihe>
wanted to move it. So I asked hin. \ ie\. do \ ou want me to move
my car, you w ant me to ^teer it olf. i le gues. I d« <n t mn ;
and I Go, no Fd rather do it it'Ninv ..tr ; •:: i li< \\n\k
know, Fm sure you've got enough othei tun u* io So i
volunteered to move my own car.

(R. 93:54).
Presence of gun in area over which defendant had control and in which were
located other personal effects. The gun was found in a backpack located on the front
passenger seat of a car over which defendant had had exclusive control for approximately
eight hours (R. 93:10, 60-62). Moreover, the gun was found in the same backpack in
which defendant's cigarette rolling papers were found (R. 93:10, 12-13. 56).
Other considerations: witness credibility. Finally, defendant testified at trial.
Thus, the trial court had the opportunity to observe defendant's demeanor and evaluate
his credibility as he proclaimed his innocence. Here, the trial court obviously did not
find defendant credible. "[Tjrial courts are accorded great discretion in determining
factual matters" because "*[t]hey are in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses/' State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262. «[ 10, 988 P.2d 7.
From this evidence, the trial court could infer that defendant knew the gun was in
the car and that he exercised control over it just as he did his cigarette rolling papers. Cf
Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20 (holding evidence sufficient to establish constructive possession
where "occupancy and control was evidenced by the presence of his personal effects in
the same room as [the contraband]"); Rivera. 906 P.2d at 320 (holding fact that gun may
have been girlfriend's 'Svould not negate a finding of defendant's constructive
possession when it was shown that he had dominion and control over the gun"): State v.
SeeL 827 P.2d 954, 962 (Utah App. 1992) (holding evidence sufficient to establish
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constructive possession where defendant knew gun was in suitcase on back seal a:u had
access to it if he wanted to use
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720 P.2d at 1384; Salas, 820 P.2d at l^oo.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
II.

D E F E N D A N T ' S S E N T E N C E S S H O U L D BE AFFIRMED WHERE
DEFENSE COUNSEL SPOKE AT SENTENCING AND
DEFENDANT R E C E I V E D T H E VERY S E N T E N C E S C
L
REQUESTED
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error at sentencing because,
i..'.
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information material to the iniposition of sentence."" Aplt. Br. at 20 (quoting Utah R.
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Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) provides:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant
an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given
an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition
of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). This rule "imposes an affirmative obligation on the trial court to
extend the opportunity to be heard; it does not contemplate the court will passively wait
for counsel to make a request to be heard." State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241. If 32, 3 I
P.3d 615, cert granted, 43 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002).
Defendant claims the trial court here violated rule 22(a) because it "heard from
neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor" before imposing sentence. Aplt. Br. at 20.
However, in fact defense counsel spoke at defendant's sentencing. Moreover, defendant
received the exact sentences his counsel requested. Thus, the case on which defendant
relies, Wanosik is distinguishable. Aplt. Br. at 21.
In Wanosik, defendant "was represented at the hearing by counsel but did not
appear personally at the hearing." 2001 UT App 241, at f 5. Defense counsel "expressed
to the court her belief that Wanosik had intended to appear for sentencing" and asked the
court "to give counsel time to locate [him]." Id. The trial court rejected defense
counsel's request and, without further input from either defense counsel or the prosecutor,
sentenced defendant to the maximum terms—one year and six months respectively—on
each of his convictions, despite AP&P's recommendation of lighter sentences. Id. at
14
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defendant cannot show that cithei c P.2d at 1208-09 (holding defendant must establish both error and obvious error to succeed
on plain error claim).
• M o r e o \ "'

• nil i\w in ill

ii | i j

II - i mj |

HI (|y

lase, 4 li'iiilani i i

«i
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sentence (R. 94:Tab 7:1-3). In addition, those sentences were apparently consistent w ith
those recommended in his presentence investigation report (R. 94:Tab 7:1-3). Cf.
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 33 (concluding failure to hear from counsel was not
harmless where sentences given were more severe than those recommended in
presentence investigation report).
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED }±_ May 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNnC
Assistant Attorney General

3

Defendant also claims he should be resentenced because "'[t]he due process
clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act
on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence.'" Apit. Br. at 19 (quoting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)).
However, defendant neither includes a copy of his presentence investigation report in the
record on appeal, nor identifies any information on which the trial court improperly
relied. "Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998). "In
the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court can only assume the regularity of
the proceedings below." Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67; see also State v. Blubanglu 904 P.2d
688, 699 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, defendant's claim fails.
16
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ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998)
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to
have — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary
device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third
degree felony.

RULE 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
fa) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendants
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
if) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202( 1Kb), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

